Hypnotism: Its History, Practice and Theory

 

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to act so, or sometimes says he believes he acted so of his own accord, and gives some reason or other for his action —anything but post-hypnotic suggestion. This feeling of freedom of will when there is actually an irresistible impulse at work has frequently been used as an argument in support of determinism. We see here that a state has been induced by experiment, in which the subject has the feeling that he is acting freely, while in reality his will has already been directed in a particular manner. Ribot, Forel and others have called attention to the light that post-hypnotic suggestion has thrown on the problem of free-will. The following experiment that I have


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frequently made, and that can be repeated by any one on a suitable subject, illustrates the illusion of free-will very clearly. I suggest to a hypnotic subject, X., to lay an umbrella on the ground after he wakes. He wakes, and I now tell him to do anything he pleases, but that he is to act entirely of his own free-will; at the same time I give him a folded paper on which I have written what he is to do. X. does what I suggested, and is then much astonished to find written on the paper the action he has carried out and in the performance of which he firmly believed he acted of his own free-will.
Of course, we must not exaggerate the importance of these hypnotic experiments, neither should we draw general conclusions about free-will from them; for we may be nearly certain that there will be a feeling of free-will only when the action is agreeable to the individuality of the subject. If, for instance, a morally normal man were told to take another's watch or to commit some other improper act, the feeling of aversion would be strong enough to suppress the feeling of free-will. A subjective constraint would then be felt. The feeling of free-will is much more likely to be aroused by post-hypnotic suggestion when the acts suggested are indifferent and unimportant than when they are momentous and at the same time opposed to the subject's individuality. We come across something similar in the normal waking state; in that, as Freud has rightly pointed out, the feeling of free-will arises soonest when the proceedings are unimportant, while when more important decisions are concerned the feeling of being unable to act in any but one way almost invariably predominates. Finally, we must also beware of exaggerating the importance of hypnotic experiment, since we do not by any means find these deep hypnoses and subjective delusions of the judgment in all subjects. Such subjects are invariably very few in number, and after repeated experiments most of them begin to observe themselves, which makes them conscious of the constraint put upon them. Finally, I must not omit

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